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Abstract: Major challenges have been created by the unprecedented international economic 
and  financial  crisis  (starting  Autumn  2008)  with  significant  impact  on  the  EU’s  social 
sector calling into question not only the banking sector, but also many of the achievements that had 
already been taken for granted in the EU like the Schengen Area or the Euro zone. This article 
argues that, in the last five years, the impact of the crisis throughout Europe has become more 
evident on the employment market, the relation of the majority with the immigrants, minorities and 
the  marginal  members  of  the  society.  Our  approach  underlines  that  there  is  a  real need  for 
increased European trans-national socio-economic cooperation and policies in order to deal with 
the  causes  of  the  crisis  and  such  a  “coherent  European  exit  strategy”  could  be Europe  2020 
Strategy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
According to many economists, the financial crisis that hit the global economy since the 
summer of 2007 is without precedent in contemporary economic history, with significant impact on 
the EU‟s social sector. Its size and extent are breath-taking questioning not only the banking sector, 
but  also  many  of  the  achievements  that  had  already  been  taken  for  granted  in  the  EU  like 
the Schengen Area, the Euro zone or the EU integration process. Although the crisis has many 
features in common with similar financial-stress driven recession episodes in the past (see the Great 
Depression of the 1930s), its socio-economic and security impact throughout Europe is far more 
evident on the employment market, the relation of the majority with the immigrants, minorities and 
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the marginal members of the society. This situation calls for an integrated trans-national approach 
to  deal  with  the socio-economic effects  of the  crisis  and this  strategy  could  be  Europe‟s 2020 
Strategy. 
 
1.  THE EFFECTS OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS ON THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Far from being over, the European crisis is getting worse and it‟s socio-economic and security 
effects  are  becoming  more  visible  due  to  “disturbing  levels  of poverty and  deprivation  among 
children and youth” according to an article from The Guardian (Smith, 2014). The causes of the 
economic  crisis  resemble  those  of  other  events  of  this  type,  like  “long  periods  of  rapid  credit 
growth,  low  risk  premiums,  abundant  availability  of  liquidity,  strong  leveraging,  soaring  asset 
prices and the development of bubbles in the real estate sector” (European Commission, 2009, p.1).  
Although EU politicians talk about overcoming the crisis, austerity and economic realities of 
different countries severely affected by it, such as Romania, Greece, Bulgaria, Portugal, Spain, Italy 
or Cyprus come to contradict the EU political optimism / populism. In Cyprus, the rate of poverty 
among citizens aged over 65 reached 29.3% (Smith, 2014), while in Greece the situation is even 
worst.  
The bankruptcy of Greece posed many questions in term of managing inter- and transnational 
relations. Furthermore, it contributed to the public perception of the EU as an oxygen mask that can 
resuscitate any patient (Bunce, 2003), regardless of how serious the problems might be. In this 
context, the internationally acknowledged coma of Greece is both relevant and harmful, since it 
leads to a destructive argument that might encourage other countries to follow the pattern: if there 
were bailout plans for Greece, no matter how serious their financial problems were, there should be 
a way out for other EU members, as well.  
The country's political scene has undergone important changes, causing the rise and popular 
support for extreme right-wing parties, hasty measures and populist discourse. This crisis has also 
the potential to undermine all institutions and progress made by the European Union in order to 
achieve the "United States of Europe" (Ivan, 2009). 
Considering the EU the saving solution to all its citizens‟ problems, even to the deficient 
internal management is not a new issue.  The European officials and the institutions they represent 
have often been perceived as a viable alternative to the slow, corrupt and incompetent leadership at 
national level. Still, the recent years‟ development has proved some failures in terms of European 
consolidation.  To begin with, the lack of mechanisms of control on the Member States and Greece 
is a particularly pertinent example in this respect, since European officials have failed to identify the CES Working Papers – Volume VI, Issue 2 
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real problems, being target of the downright deceit of the Greek authorities. The absence of such 
procedures  hampers  the  avoidance  of  further  similar  cases,  threatening,  at  the  same  time,  the 
security of the EU‟s countries. The positive aspect is that all that speculation occurred immediately 
after the crisis has not emerged into something real, remaining pure supposition. Moreover, the EU 
does not seem to react when citizens of two of its member states (the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands) are prejudiced following the Iceland banking collapse, taking into consideration the 
wider context of Iceland‟s accession process to the EU (BBC News
 , 2011).  
Another  aspect  that  indicates  the  vulnerability  of  the  EU  is  the  way  it  organizes  its 
expenditure. The financial report of the European Court of Auditors published in November 2010 
indicates major errors of calculation of the 2009 spending on agriculture, structural funds, research, 
education  and  foreign  aid,  categories  that  bring  together  more  than  90%  of  the  EU  budget 
(European Court of Auditors, 2010). These errors can be traced back to the activity of the Member 
States, where irregularities are annually observed by the regulatory authorities in Luxembourg. Still, 
the  sum  that  the  European  Commission  recovered  from  inaccurate  or  misleading  project 
implementation  in  2009  was  with  approximately  400  million  larger  than  in  the  previous  year. 
Regardless of the reasons underlying such a process, the improvement of the management of EU 
expenditure can avoid or at least diminish further issues in this respect.  
The examples presented above illustrate how the EU has neither the self-sufficient potential 
nor the plans for problem-solving at macro level. The existence of disruptions is imminent within 
such an institution as the EU, but it is of the utmost important how these issues are dealt with. We 
argue that there is no reason for a country with an ailing economy to wait for the saving intervention 
of the EU. European support should be useful, but not addictive.  
 
2.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CRISIS ON THE SCHENGEN AREA 
 
The consequences of this crisis are not totally identifiable because it has not finished yet and 
its effects extend beyond national borders or development sectors. On the other hand, it is possible 
to  identify  some  outcomes  arising  from  the  economic  recession.  The  magnitude  and  the 
consequences of the crisis emphasized the need for a unified reaction and for political coordination 
between EU‟s member states from a geopolitical perspective since the EU has to act as a single 
political actor (McNamara, 2010, p.22).   CES Working Papers – Volume VI, Issue 2 
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The severe financial instabilities and the strong economic recession that brought the political 
ascension  of  populist  anti-European  parties  alongside  with  the  resurgence  of  nationalism  and 
protectionism are also affecting the Schengen accession process
*.   
Amid economic crisis, the increased levels of unemployment, inflation and cuts in the budget 
in several sectors, governments have brought to the forefront of political discussions the issue of 
illegal immigration and, consequently, the agreement of free movement. The main concern was the 
wave of unemployed from the states of Central and Eastern Europe, mainly Romania and Bulgaria. 
At the same time, the severe crises in Greece, Ireland and Portugal began to raise questions not only 
about the Schengen Area but also about the euro zone survival (Arestis & Sawyer, 2012, p. 3). 
Experts  underlined  the  fact  that  an  important  cause  of  the  euro  crisis  was  the  EU‟s  lack  of 
competence in harmonizing national economies with different levels of competitiveness and various 
levels of financial difficulty (Corbu, Ştefăniţă, 2013, p.8). 
In this context, the Schengen integration process (based on the Schengen Agreement
†) faced 
substantial mutations, with repercussions on the very idea of participation, inclusion, or having full 
rights within a form of security based on entirely different principles. 
Lately for that matter, due to national security reasons, some of the Schengen Member States 
have reinstated controls at the internal b orders for a limited period, especially on the occasion of 
certain events. In this respect, Norway applied these measures during the Nobel Prize ceremony or 
Poland, which conducted such activities during the European Football Championship. Denmark, 
followed partially by France and Germany tried to unilaterally impose internal border controls 
(C￢mpeanu, 2013).  
In 2013, after the Boston attacks in the United States, the Schengen Member States took into 
consideration an increase in security at the internal borders. In this context, the European Union 
decided to reform the Schengen Agreement, so that since 2014, the Member States will be able to 
reinstate controls at the national borders for a maximum of 2 years. Thus, an emergency mechanism 
was adopted which can be activated by the Schengen states fearing a massive immigration wave. 
This mechanism has increased the wave of xenophobia, as demonstrated by French case: the 
ascent of the National Front in local/national polls, the anti-Roma campaign and the nationalist 
discourse.  
The decision was communicated to the European Commissioner for Internal Affairs, Cecilia 
Malmström.  She  stated  that  the  Member  States,  the  European  Commission  and  the  European 
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Parliament reached a common view in this respect. The new regulations will come into force after a 
transition period in the fall of 2014. Nevertheless, the agreement is required to be approved by the 
plenary of the European Parliament and The Member States, but the gesture can be only considered 
a formality at this point (Diaconu, Colintineanu, 2013). 
The  reform  allows  for  the  possibility  of  internal  border  controls  to  be  applied  only  in 
exceptional cases and only as a last resort, when a European state can no longer protect its external 
borders and when the internal security of the European states is threatened, unilateral endeavors 
being forbidden by the new project.  
In an optimistic scenario, the crisis might prove to be a catalyst for positive socio-economic 
and political changes, but at the same time it can turn into a high risk political instrument called 
“the  fear  of  immigrants”.  In  political  discourses,  through  amalgamation  and  contextualization, 
themes such as foreigners, immigrants are identified as the cause of several internal socio-economic 
and security-related issues, in an attempt to cover the policymakers‟ failure in identifying viable 
measures to overcome the economic crisis.  
 
3.  THE EFFECTS OF THE LABOR MARKET AND THE MEASURES TAKEN TO 
FIGHT AGAINST UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
The social and unemployment situation within the EU remained critical in the fourth quarter 
of 2012, the number of jobs decreasing and the rate of unemployment rising globally, while the 
financial situation of households was still severe, according to the latest Quarterly Bulletin of the 
European Commission on employment and social situation. In some Member States, the negative 
effects of budget cuts and increased taxes upon employment and living standards are more and 
more apparent. The statistics also show that the net immigration from outside the EU decreased, and 
furthermore, the crisis has a negative impact on the birth rate (European Commission, 2013a).  
Unemployment continued to rise in January 2013, affecting 26.2 million people in the EU (19 
million in the Euro zone), i.e. 10.8% of the active population (11.9% in the Euro zone). The gap in 
terms of unemployment rate between the South/periphery and the North of the Euro zone reached 
an unprecedented value of 10 percentage points in 2012. The EU GDP contracted by 0.5% during 
the fourth quarter of 2012, being the largest decline since the beginning of 2009. The global level of 
employment in the EU decreased with 0.4% in 2012, positive developments being registered only in 
respect of part-time jobs. Only in the fourth quarter of 2012, the level of employment decreased 
with 0.2% as compared to the previous quarter (European Commission, 2013a). CES Working Papers – Volume VI, Issue 2 
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In March 2013, the European Council confirmed that the tackling of the unemployment issue 
and the social consequences of the crisis represent a major priority of the EU policies as well as the 
national  state  policies.  Thus,  in  February  2013,  the  Commission  presented  a  set  of  measures 
regarding  social  investments  (European  Commission,  2013b).  This  set,  which  is  an  integrated 
strategic framework taking into consideration social, economic and budgetary differences between 
the Member States offer them guidelines for a greater efficiency and effectiveness of the social 
policies  in  response  to  the  challenges  they  face.  As  a  result,  they  focus  on:  adapting  social 
protection  systems  to  the  needs  of  the  people  going  through  critical  stages  of  life;  additional 
measures need to be taken to reduce the risk of social exclusion and thus avoid greater social costs 
in the future; simplified and better oriented social policies, targeting new adequate and sustainable 
social protection systems; some states achieve better results in the social domain than others do, 
despite  the  fact  that  they  have  similar  or  smaller  budgets,  which  proves  that  it  is  possible  to 
streamline social policy spending; modernizing active inclusion strategies applied by the Member 
States; childcare services and education with affordable and quality costs; preventing premature 
school dropout; professional training; support for employment, housing assistance and accessibility 
to medical services are all policy areas with a strong social dimension. 
The set concerning social investments is closely related to the European platform regarding 
the fight against poverty and social  exclusion. This initiative provides the Member States with 
guidelines  and  favorable  directions  for  the  necessary  national  reforms  to  achieve  the  common 
objectives  agreed  upon  in  the  2020  Europe  Strategy  (smart,  sustainable,  inclusive  growth  with 
greater coordination of national and European policy
*). 
 
4.  EUROPE 2020 – A COHERENT EUROPEAN EXIT STRATEGY? 
 
Taking for example Spain, in the context of the economic crisis, the number of people at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion increased to 12.37 million in 2011 (27% of the general population, 
30.6% of children). In 2011, the share of people living in households with low labor force increased 
to 12.2%, while severe poverty reached 3.9%. The rate of unemployed people also rose to 40.4%, 
and poverty in the labor field (among workers) to 12.3%, this being the third highest level within 
the European Union (Social Europe. Current Challenges and the Way forward
 Annual Report of the Social 
Protection Committee 2012, 2013, p.220). 
In this context, in terms of social inclusion, Spain‟s objective is to reduce the risk of poverty 
for 1.4-1.5 million people by 2020, using the indicator developed by the European Commission, 
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according to which the European Union is trying to reduce the risk of poverty and social exclusion 
for 20 million people by 2020. This objective is closely related to employment and educational 
goals set by Europe 2020, namely 75% of the 20-64 year-olds to be employed and at least 40% of 
30-34–year-olds completing third level education (Europe 2020 targets). 
Each  year  in  April,  every  EU  member  state  has  to  submit  two  progress  reports 
(Stability/convergence programmes and National reform programmes ) to explain what they are 
doing to move closer to the Europe 2020 national targets. Dialogue between national, regional and 
local  government  will  bring  the  EU‟s  priorities closer  to  people,  strengthening  the  feeling  of 
ownership needed to get everyone involved in moving Europe towards the 2020 targets
*. In the 
context of bringing EU much closer to the people, the civil society is being actively involved in 
fulfilling the Europe 2020 goals by adopting them as being their own. 
According to the 2012 country progress reports, in the context of the prolonged crisis effects, 
the situation in terms of national employment rates target varies from country to country (from 62.9 
% in Malta to 80 % in Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden) ( Europe 2020 Targets: Employment 
Rate, p.2) with direct consequences on the general Europe 2020 goals. In this situation the EU 
member  states  shall  endeavor  considerable  effort  to  reach  the  target  of  75  %  proposed  by  the 
European Commission in March 2010. 
In  this  context,  the  success  of  the  Europe  2020  Strategy  depends  on  an  integrated  and 
coherent approach to all areas of action, with a special focus on social, economic and employment, 
along with a close collaboration between all levels of government, relevant stakeholders and civil 
society. 
As  we  saw  during  our  analysis,  the  economic  crisis  managed  to  challenge  many  of  the 
achievements that had already been taken for granted in the EU like the Schengen Area, the Euro 
zone or the EU integration process with important socio-economic and security impact. Another 
aspect worth mentioning is the effect on the relation of the majority with the immigrants, minorities 
and the marginal members of the society.  
In  a  Europe  under  economic  crisis  and  a  European  Union  under  identity  crisis,  the 
immigrants,  the  unemployed,  the  marginal  members  of  the  society  continue  to  be  the  ideal 
scapegoats  in  political  discourses  highlighting the lack of real  social  EU integration. Since the 
process of European integration was mostly based on economic instruments, the recovery of the 
economic  situation  is  mandatory  for  continuing  the  Europeanization  process  (Corbu,  Ştefăniţă, 
2013, p.6). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Hence, we argue that the role of the EU within the international system is undoubtedly an 
important one, but poorly shaped so far. The significant degree of heterogeneity among member 
states further influences the decision-making process when it is expected from the EU to act and 
react as a coherent actor on the world stage. The economic crisis that broke up in 2008 was a real 
test for the EU‟s capability to successfully manage the relations within it. The problems of some 
Member States and their further appeal to receive financial support from the richer ones (especially 
from Germany) have weakened its ability to aggregate various national interests and to create a 
common European vision.  The economic crisis managed to challenge many of the achievements 
that had already been taken for granted in the EU like the Schengen Area, the Euro zone or the EU 
integration process with important socio-economic and security impact. 
In this context, the 2020 European Strategy can be a viable solution for the Union to escape 
the  crisis  and  can  contribute  to  the  “European  dream”  –  a  Europe  closer  to  its  citizens,  if  it 
continues to publish actual measures, implementation plans and budgetary provisions, consultations 
and  coordination  between  various  institutional  actors.  As  for  the  rest,  most  actions  are  a 
continuation of already existing policies, programmes and networks. 
 It is time for the challenge of change in EU! 
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